This paper first shows the key role of the Korean entertainment firms in the K-pop wave: they have found the right niche in which to operatethe 'dance-intensive' segment-and worked out a very innovative mix of old and new technologies for developing the Korean comparative advantages in this segment. Secondly, the paper focuses on the most significant features of the Korean market which have contributed to the K-pop success in the world: the relative smallness of this market, its high level of competition, its lower prices than in any other large developed country, and its innovative ways to cope with intellectual property rights issues. Thirdly, the paper discusses the many ways the K-pop wave could ensure its sustainability, in particular by developing and channeling the huge pool of skills and resources of the current Kpop stars to new entertainment and art activities. Last but not least, the paper addresses the key issue of the 'Koreanness' of the K-pop wave: does K-pop send some deep messages from and about Korea to the world? It argues that it does.
INTRODUCTION
First is the decisive role of a few Korean firms operating in the 'dance and song' (hereafter DS) segment of the vast entertainment world. Section 1 shows how these firms have progressively gathered and mastered all the elements necessary for a world success: first targeting a neglected but very promising segment of the world entertainment demand which suited perfectly the artistic skills existing in Korea; then developing these skills and delivering them to the world by a unique combination of old and new techniques-a technological and business shift in the entertainment sector as dramatic as the one introduced by the Japanese carmakers in the car production thirty years ago.
The second economic factor is the set of market-and price-based incentives which have propelled the K-pop onto the world markets. Section 2 shows that small and very competitive Korean markets, with some elements of innovation-friendly concentration and a very peculiar price structure (buying songs on-line in Korea is much cheaper than in the other industrial countries), have strongly induced Korean DS firms and K-pop stars to go abroad as energetically as possible. However, it should be stressed that these factors alone could not have triggered the K-pop wave without the decisive actions of the Korean DS firms. The K-pop success raises the question of its sustainability which is examined in section 3. Will the current K-pop wave be another short-lived hype, as so often the case in the vast entertainment world? Or, will it a powerful source of wide ranging diversification, nurturing Korean waves in other entertainment or art activities? This sustainability issue raises in turn a question that haunts many Koreans: does the current K-pop wave channel a sense of 'Koreanness' to the rest of the world, a question left for the conclusion.
SECTION 1. KOREAN DS FIRMS' STRATEGIES: BLENDING OLD AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Korea was definitively not an obvious candidate to become the epicenter of a tsunami wave in music entertainment. It faces (still does) the language barrier which matters in pop music if one sets aside English that half a century of US-and UK-pop dominance has made a kind of "franca lingua" (common language) for popular songs. Although based on an alphabet, the Korean language is difficult to learn. It is spoken by roughly 80 millions of people in the world (making it close to the German language) but this figure includes the 25 million secluded North Koreans and the 10 million members of the Korean diaspora disseminated in Central Asia. Until the mid-1990s, Korean officials were routinely stressing that Korea was a developing country. This was not a mark of Confucian humility, but reflected the vivid memory that in the early 1970s, Korea's GDP per capita was still close to the GDP per capita of a Sub-Saharan African country. In the late 1990s, the nascent confidence of the Koreans in their economic "miracle" was crushed by the Asian financial crisis which was more severe in Korea than the one currently ongoing in Europe and in the US.
In short, in the late 1990s, Korea was facing huge entry costs in a world entertainment market largely dominated by US and other English-speaking performers. As a result, the very few Korean DS firms had to answer three strategic questions:
 on the demand side, did it exist segments of the DS sector which could offer good prospects to Korean performers?  on the supply side, which were the segments in which Korean performers could have right away comparative advantages (skills) giving them a chance to be successful relatively quickly?  on the supply side again, which were the technologies allowing Korean firms and performers, almost unknown outside Korea, to emerge quickly as full players first in regional markets, then in world markets?
By providing appropriate and innovative answers to these three questions, the Korean DS firms have generated the current K-pop wave.
1.1.
Demand: spotting a niche for K-pop Court music and popular Korean Pansori rely almost exclusively on song and music. Singers or musicians are generally static on the stage which tends to be cluttered with musical instruments, leaving little room to potential dancers. Today European popular music still follows largely this pattern, with a strong reliance on the national language.
The key innovation introduced by the US-UK pop music in the 1960s was a shift towards a higher 'dance intensity'. This was mostly achieved by a 'swinging' music, but with only limited dancing by some performers. Performances on the stage remained often static, partly because, until recently, singers have had no incentive to cultivate their potential dancing skills since the existing supports for music (LPs and CDs) could not convey any visual element. As a result, dancing was often left to 'backstage' dancers. This situation did not change much with the emergence of music TV-channels (such as MTV) because these TV networks brought a 'visuality' into the pop music (with the video-clips) limited to TV screens. However, there were a few remarkable exceptions-the most remarkable one being Michael Jackson with his exceptional dancing skills. It is no surprise that Michael Jackson is a key reference to most of the K-pop stars of the 2000s.
Figure 1. The main segments of the music and dance entertainment
At the other extreme (bottom right) of the spectrum, Figure 1 lists entertainment segments that are more dance-intensive than song-intensive. In these segments, dancers take over the stage, music and song become mere supports (instruments are often not visible), and the performances become much more dynamic and visual.
The current K-pop wave pertains to this last part of the spectrum, with a definitive shift from song-intensive to dance-intensive performances in the mid-2000s under the influence of Rain, and his brilliant dancing skills. Interestingly, Figure 1 shows that K-pop has many 'cousins', from the European Classical Ballets (see below) to 'Disco' to traditional Korean popular rural dances ('Namsadang') to B-boying. Last but not least, the new technologies of the mid-and late 2000s have made possible the permanent visuality of the K-pop wave via
Internet (YouTube and its competitors) on ubiquitous portable screens (smart phones, tablets, etc.). 6 6 The Korean DS firms have greatly benefited from the very innovative environment generated by the Korean electronic firms in terms of information technology. But, the K-pop wave has also benefited from the direct role of some members of the Samsung family [Russell 2008 ].
As a result, Figure 1 leads to two complementary conclusions. First, if Korean performers are present in all the DS segments, they do not enjoy an equally easy access to world audiences. Korean language and the pentatonic scale of Korean music make (much) more problematic the success of Korean singers than the success of Korean dancers. 7 Second, the dance-intensive segment was largely neglected by the recent world pop music, with the total disappearance of the Disco in the mid-1980s and Michael Jackson's de facto retirement since the mid-1990s. In sum, a key segment of the DS entertainment was largely untapped in the mid-1990s, and the language was not a barrier in this segment. 8
This conclusion did no escape long the attention of the main Korean DS firms. In this respect, it is important to stress that, in contrast with the large US, EU or Japanese DS firms, the main Korean DS firms of the 2000s (SM, YG and JYP) have been run by former or existing dancers and/or singers who have a deep insider knowledge of their sector and of the artistic strengths and weaknesses of their Korean fellows. 9 As a result, their firms were well equipped to assess if there were in Korea potential performers with the basic skills needed to enter successfully the dance-intensive segment-in other words, if there were initial 'comparative advantages' in Korea for this specific segment.
Supply: discovering K-pop initial comparative advantages
Economic analysis shows that a country has always some comparative advantage, that is, can always produce some goods or services relatively more efficiently than the other countries. This universal lesson (so counter-intuitive for non-economists) has been amply illustrated since the Second World War. Korea is a particularly good example, starting with comparative advantages in relatively unskilled labor-intensive basic goods (textiles) and
shifting progressively to increasingly higher-skilled labor-intensive and higher-tech products (from cars to electronics). 7 A pentatonic scale is a musical scale based on five notes per octave, in contrast to the heptatonic (seven notes) scale generally used in K-pop music. 8 As stressed by the economic analysis of international trade, what counts are the relative skills, not the absolute ones. Michael Jackson was both an excellent dancer and singer, but it remains above all as the "moon walker" for most people. In other words, when compared to other performers, his talent as a dancer was even more remarkable than his singing skills. 9 Lee, Sooman (founder of SM Entertainment) was a singer, Yang, Hyun Suk (founder of YG Entertainment) was a dancer (in a famous Korean group, Seo Taeji and Boys) choreographer and singer, Park, Jin Young (founder of JYP Entertainment) was a dancer and singer.
Indeed, the Korean DS firms have benefited from two vibrant sources of Korean dancers-one traditional and one modern-which have constituted the initial basis of K-pop comparative advantages in the dance-intensive segment. 10  the tradition of rural dance in Korea is still very lively: 'Namsadang' dances are a must in every Korean street when there is a popular event. 11 Namsadang dances possess the key features that characterize today K-pop bands: they are danced by bands, with each dancer taking the lead at one point of time with his specific performance, they are accompanied by a music with a strong 'addictive' tone, and they emit an intense energy.  the recent but deep attraction of young Koreans for urban B-boying, a dance where Korea has rapidly emerged as one of the leading countries in the 1990s and the 2000s. In contrast, the US or EU curve WW' exhibits relatively larger singing capacities compared 10 In other words, Korean DS firms have first looked at the existing Korea's endowments (as suggested by the so-called Heckscher-Ohlin approach in the economic analysis of international trade). 11 Traditionally, Namsadang were danced by groups of male dancers, going from village to village. 12 For example, Woo-hyuk Jang (H.O.T), Son Dambi, U-Know Yunho (TVXQ) and Jay Park (2PM). The attraction of Koreans for B-boying is easy to understand when one recognizes a few key similarities between Bboying and some aspects of Namsadang dances. to dancing capacities. The line WK reproduces the range of DS activities described in Figure   1 . The points K and W illustrate the best baskets of entertainment activities to be produced by the K-pop and by the US/-EU-pop, respectively.
Discovering initial Korea's comparative advantages was not an easy process for the Korean DS firms. It was a long trial and error process. For instance, BoA's success in Japan (with her song 'Listen to my Heart' 2002) still relies on a heavy song-intensity carefully delivered in Japanese-making her a quasi-local performer [Lie 2012 ]. Rain may have been the first Korean performer relying systematically on his dancing skills in the mid-2000s (he often sung in Korean outside Korea). These two examples still rely on individual performers-hence remain close to the Michael Jackson's format. But, the transition to boysand girls-bands was not a difficult move in a Korean environment so much saturated with the tradition of Namsadang bands.
More on supply: developing Korean comparative advantages
Once identified, Korea's initial key skills had to be developed. This is where the major  to ensure that dancers will meet the incredibly high requirements imposed by dancing;
 to give a specific 'touch' to the dancers trained (as it is the case for the French or Russian Schools of Ballet) which is a critical element of the 'branding' of the K-pop bands (Ballets) among the fans (connoisseurs);  to specialize the various members of the band according to their skills and to combine them in the best way possible;  to increase the variety of performances provided by the band, including by creating sub-groups within the band;  to reduce the consequences of situations where a member of the band is sick or hurt (risk-management).
Combining all these features have led to K-pop bands comprising generally of four to ten members (up to thirteen in the case of Super Junior).
In-house academies is only one illustration of a key feature of the Korean DS firms: they are 'vertically integrated'-a frequent industrial structure in the Korean economy. Some inhouse songwriters and choreographers are also integrated in the firms, with other songwriters and choreographers working under contracts. This is in sharp contrast with the market-based approach prevailing in the US and EU. In these countries, performers are trained in schools unrelated to the DS firms, and then try to find firms eager to promote their titles.
More on supply: delivering Korean comparative advantages
Very traditional in their way to nurture talents, the Korean DS firms have been very innovative in delivering their titles. They have been the first ones in the world to "go on-line" (hereafter OL) massively-that is, to use social media such as Internet providers and YouTube for releasing the new titles of their bands and for marketing these titles and the associated concerts. In sharp contrast, US and EU DS firms have shifted reluctantly and slowly to the OL delivery mode. Several reasons explain this rapid and massive OL strategy of the Korean firms:
 the Asian financial crisis has hit the Korean economy at the same time than the CDs market faced its first big plunge (late 1990s), making the decline of the CDs market much more dramatic in Korea than in Japan, the US and the EU, hence requiring much more rapid and drastic measures from the Korean DS firms. 14  the Korean DS firms have been much less directly and massively involved in the CDs production than their competitors, hence have had much less incentives to protect CDs production, in contrast with the Japanese and European DS firms (Philips, Sony) which produce both CDs and content.  CDs have no visual content, hence do not promote well the dancing-intensive niche targeted by the Korean DS firms.
Going OL: becoming more efficient and more focused on content
The intensive OL strategy has made the Korean DS firms more efficient and focused on producing the DS content than their competitors. Marketing CDs requires a heavy budget in advertising and retailing services. As illustrated by Table 1 , these two activities amounted to almost 40 percent of the total costs of a typical music company-a huge amount of money diverted from what should be the core objective of any DS firm: producing content (dances, songs and spectacles). By going OL, the Korean DS firms have been able to cut substantially the costs of these two activities and, when possible, to re-allocate these funds to the core business of producing content-in short to become both more efficient and more content-focused.
Going OL: enlarging the scope of consumers' possible choices
Going OL has also strongly induced the Korean DS firms to increase massively the potential variety of choices available to the consumers first in Korea, and then (indirectly) in the rest of the world. titles whereas consumers in other countries can buy only 10 to 15 titles. In other words, Korean consumers have access to roughly 13-20 times more titles than consumers in other industrial countries, a massive expansion of the variety of the choices at their disposal-a key feature for the modern societies which price variety so highly. This result is largely due to the very low OL prices of songs in Korea compared to those in the rest of the world (CDs price in Korea are much more similar to those in the rest of the world). It raises a crucial problem: low prices mean low revenues, hence require cuts in costs.
If 'too' deep, these cuts could endanger the sustainability of the K-pop wave by forcing Korean DS firms to produce 'remakes', that is, to repeat themselves and to make variety more apparent than real (a situation faced by TV channels with multiple but rather similar shows).
So far, the Korean DS firms have been able to successfully address this challenge by profoundly reshaping the traditional model of producing DS titles:  as said above, going OL allows these firms to re-allocate, when possible, the funds saved on advertising and retailing expenses to the core activity of content production;  going OL helps the Korean DS firms to find additional resources within the DS segment because, by creating a permanent and deep relationship between the K-pop stars and their fans, Internet has fuelled the need of concerts targeting fans (with the associated events). As shown in Annex 1, half of the K-pop concerts are fan-oriented. This is a major overhaul of the pattern generated by LPs and CDs which have rather increased the distance between performers and their audiences.; 15  going OL induces Korean DS firms to find additional resources outside the DS segment For instance, as Internet is heavily used by the advertising industry, the Korean DS firms have quickly realized that they could earn substantial additional revenues by allowing their K-pop stars to become models in advertising, particularly in the cosmetic and fashion sectors;  going OL also induces Korean DS firms to find less costly techniques for producing music. For instance, Korean DS songwriters are at the forefront of using software enabling them to test the music they are composing without the use of expansive studios; 16  last but not least, the 'internationalization' of the activities of the Korean DS firms helps them to mobilize not only new funds, but also new skills. Members of the bands and/or upstream contributors (songwriters, choreographers, designers) coming from outside Korea bring with them almost inevitably more variety.
SECTION 2. MARKETS AND PRICES: THE IRRESISTIBLE PUSH FOR K-POP EXPORTS
With their strategy, the Korean DS firms have been able to grab the opportunities offered by the DS markets and prices, a success best illustrated by the huge boom of K-pop exports documented in section 2.1. This remarkable success has been driven by three main forces: the 'smallness' of the Korean DS market (section 2.2), the intensity of competition in these markets (section 2.3) and the differences between the DS prices prevailing in Korea compared to those prevailing in other industrial countries (section 2.4). Finally, section 2.5 examines how the Korean DS firms have been able to find innovative ways to handle the intellectual property rights (IPR) issues in the 2000s.
The boom in K-pop exports
Within the last few years, the Korean 'all music' (K-pop plus other Korean music) market has witnessed an unprecedented growth. Table 3 shows that the value added of the whole Korean music sector has increased at an annual average rate of 23 percent over the These exports consist almost entirely of K-pop CDs, and they do not include the massive OL sales in foreign countries nor the revenues from concerts outside Korea. As a result, the ratio of exports to value added indicated by Table 3 ( This estimate covers only 'direct' music exports. It does not take into account the Kpop music incorporated in other segments of the entertainment industry. For instance, many Korean-made games use K-pop titles in their musical background (K-pop dance festival wii, Tap sonic, etc.). Table 3 presents the basic data for the Korean electronic games sector. The fact that the Korean games sector is so large compared to the music sector suggests that the 'indirect' exports of K-pop music embedded in Korean electronic games can easily reach a level comparable to the USD 200 millions of the 'direct' K-pop exports in 2011-doubling the K-pop exports ratio. 17 Imports/VA (%) 5.3 5.7 15.7 13.8 9.9 6.4 4.9 Source: Authors based on data from KOCCA (2012), Content Industry Statistics.
The 'smallness' of the Korean DS market
The most frequent explanation given to the boom of K-pop exports is the small size of the Korean music market, a direct transposition of a similar argument made for the industrial sector. However, such an automatic transposition should not be taken as granted because, contrary to manufacturing, scale economies are not important in many aspects of the DS production: they are likely to be modest when selling OL or when making concerts. Such economies are substantial only for the CDs segment which is of marginal importance for many Korean DS firms. Finally, the Korean music market was even smaller from the 1960s to the 1990s, when there was no export success. In short, something else than the mere size of the Korean market should have been at work. Indeed, Table 4 does not show the 'smallness' factor as such an overwhelming force. The US, Japan and Britain emerge as the main countries with significantly bigger music markets than Korea-indeed bigger than what the relative GDP weights would have predicted (for instance, 20-22 times in 2010 in the US music markets compared to 15 times for the US GDP). But, the differences are shrinking fast since the mid-2006, precisely when K-pop exports prosper. And, the other countries have music markets with a similar size than those of Korea, or even with a smaller relative size than what the relative GDP weights would have predicted.
Another interpretation of the 'smallness' factor is the volatility inherent to the Korean DS markets. Figure 3 which shows the monthly CD sales of the #1 hits in Korea between January 2010 and December 2012 suggests several observations:  sales are highly volatile since they range from a low 25,000 CDs (December 2012) to 330,000 CDs (September 2012, that is, 6 percent of all the sales of the period covered);  there is no clear pattern over time: peaks and valleys occur almost randomly over the years;  there is even a possible slight decreasing trend of #1 hits sales during these three years (say after Fall 2011). In short, blockbusters are rare, very different in magnitude, hard to predict and possibly less frequent in the most recent period. Indeed, all these features are incentives for Korean DS firms to look for foreign markets as a key element of their risk-management policy.
The level of competition in the Korean CD markets
A second driving force behind the K-pop export boom is the level of concentrationhence competition-in the Korean DS markets. Highly competitive Korean domestic markets should induce Korean DS firms to look for 'easier' markets in the rest of the world.
A separate analysis of the level of concentration in the CDs and OL markets is necessary because the Korean DS firms' determined strategy to charge very low download prices has divided the Korean music markets into these two segments much more sharply than in any other industrial country:
 the OL segment is the one where Korean consumers can test every possible new DS title since it is so cheap to listen to and to watch new releases.  by contrast, the CDs market is the one where Korean consumers satisfy their deep preferences-it is the market for the 'fans'. 18 CDs of the K-pop bands are conceived by the Korean DS firms more as 'collectors' than as mere CDs. They target a 'fan' base that needs to be satisfied on an almost permanent basis because of the very close links between the K-pop stars and their fans (the status among fans is partly determined by the number of CDs owned). While CDs are the 'product-based' link between a band and its fans, concerts reserved for the fans are the 'service-based' link.
Indeed, new CDs are often released in conjunction with concerts for the fans. This core function of the CDs explains the amazing profusion of different types of CDs (full albums, mini-CDs, pre-released and re-masterized versions, etc.) in the Korean DS sector.
As a result, the following analysis of the level of concentration in the Korean DS markets considers five different markets:
 the #1hits CDs market and the Top10 hits CDs market; the #1hits CDs market is taken into account because it is such a key element of the success record of a DS firm;  the Top10 downloads (Gaon Chart) and the Top10 streaming (Gaon Chart) hits for the non-visual OL (NVOL) markets;  the Top10 hits in the visual OL (YouTube) segment; this segment is the one which focuses most on the visual element of the K-pop wave.
It should be stressed that prices vary a lot among these five markets: they are substantial for the CDs market, low for the NVOL markets, and nil for the YouTube segment. Shifting the focus to the Korean DS firms and their upstream contributors (block B of Table 5 ) suggests also three observations:
 the Herfindahl indexes in the CDs and YouTube markets are substantially higher than those prevailing in the final consumers perspective. For the #1hits, it is even (much)
above the threshold (0.2500) which is analyzed as a situation of market power by the US competition authorities. In sharp contrast, the Herfindahl index remains low in the NVOL markets, again reflecting the much higher variety of choices allowed by the OL technologies.  the C4 coefficients are also systematically and significantly higher than their level in the final consumers markets, mirroring the fact that the major Korean DS firms manage several K-pop bands.  The same unexpected and very interesting result is that only YG pertains to the C4 club in the five markets, with SM and JYP not in the top C4 in two of these markets (respectively, OL and CDs). 20
19 Surprisingly, Psy is not ranked among the Top10 CDs sales, and he does not pertain to the C4 bands in the CD and NVOL markets (he is only 6 th and 7 th in the download and streaming markets, respectively). 20 One may wonder whether this result does not reflect to some extent the origins of the founders of these three firms (the former singer being more in tune with the CD markets, the former dancer with the OL markets To sum up, the level of competition in the Korean DS markets-very competitive markets with respect to the final consumers with some elements of dominance in the upstream markets-does generate incentives for Korean DS firms to look for 'easier' foreign markets in the rest of the world where to prosper.
Prices and revenues in Korea and in the rest of the world: the big rift
The last force (from a supply side perspective) behind the K-pop export boom flows from the fact that Korean prices of K-pop are much lower than the corresponding ones in the rest of the world-hence driving all K-pop actors (firms and stars) to go abroad [Cho 2012 ]. Notes: Korea case A: price per song for downloading a package of 100 to 150 songs per month. Korea case B: price per song in the "hold-back system" implemented since March. 2013 ("hold-back system" allows IPR holders to guarantee of a certain level income from the newly released songs by requiring music service providers to hold back the sales of the songs at the discounted rate: the service providers should sell the songs at the set price (600 won) for a period of time. Korea case C: price per song on mp3 charged by Amazon. For these comparisons, and exchange rate of 1$ 1,100 Korean Won has been used (for details see Annex 3).
Source: Authors based on data from iTunes, Amazon, and Korean internet retail stores (Melon, Soribada, etc.) (columns 1 to 7) and on the IPR index of the World Economic Forum (columns 8 and 9). 21 Table 6 gives a sense of the big rift between Korean and foreign OL prices:
 Column 1 gives the Korean and foreign prices of downloading music as of April 2013.
Column 2 presents the same information by indexing all the prices on the Korean price (case A): foreign prices range from 10 times (US low range) to 27 times (Japan) the comparable Korean case A price.  Column 3 gives the share of the price received by the performers, column 4 calculates their corresponding revenue. Column 5 shows that the revenue for Korean performers range from 13 times (US low range) to 37 times (Japan) the revenue earned in Korea for the same title.  Columns 6 and 7 provide similar information on the prices for streaming. The price differentials are much smaller, but they are still substantial, with foreign prices 4 to 6 times higher than those in Korea, and with roughly the same ranking in terms of the 'most' profitable countries.
These results deserve a caveat. Table 6 does not take into account the fact that costs in foreign countries could be higher than those in Korea (hence justifying higher prices).
However, the observed price differences are so large that it seems unlikely that they could be reversed by costs differences in the OL business. Table 6 suggests a desirable strategy to K-pop stars: they should target first Japan-by far the most profitable market-then France and the other EU markets, and then the US, with the caveat that the US market can generate larger reputation effects than any other country.
Interestingly, this conclusion fits well the observed behavior of the K-pop stars.
The K-pop sector and the intellectual property rights issue
During the 2000s, Korea has begun to implement a regime of intellectual property rights (IPRs) increasingly similar to the ones enforced in other OECD Members. 22 Paradoxically, 21 The World Economic Forum IPR index is constructed based on a survey of CEOs to capture experiential or perception on the IPR regimes that influence the business and investment in the market. 22 This evolution is still not complete, as best illustrated by a recent ruling of the Seoul Central District Court [Korea Time April 2013] according to which digital music files transmitted by online music service providers in the context of a department store cannot be seen as 'albums for sale', hence are not eligible for royalties to be paid to copyright owners. The lawsuit was filed by the Federation of Korean Music Performers (FKMP) and the Korean Association of Phonogram Producers (KAPP) against Hyundai Department Store demanding payment during the same decade, this regime has been under increasing criticisms in the OECD countries. At the core of the debate is the economic impact of IPR which is very sensitive to the quality of the IPR regulations and of their implementation. Too lax IPR or too loosely enforced IPR may reduce the desirable production of goods or services. But too strong IPR or too tightly enforced IPR fuel anti-competitive behavior [Furukawa 2010 ].
These criticisms are particularly strong in the DS sector because IPR are particularly developed in this sector where IPR protect not only songwriters, but also performers and DS firms involved in the production and distribution of the titles. 23 Such a tight IPR regime in the DS sector has raised questions from OECD consumers and policy-makers [Aguiar and Martens 2013] such as: why do IPR last so long? Why do they last after the death of the songwriters, and protect his/her heirs? Why do they include DS firms as right-holders, particularly when the price of producing music is declining thanks to electronic techniques?
As a result, the OECD countries have witnessed resistance to IPR in the 2000s (the fights on P2P in music a few years ago, on the 'torrent' technique in film today, etc.). 24 Interestingly, such a tight IPR regime generates uneasiness even among songwriters and among those who value artistic works. Songwriters generally compose above all because they want to 'create' (maximizing their profits are not their main concern). In a interview, Rain [KBS World 2010] echoes this crucial point: 'I know the problems generated by illegal downloading, but I cannot use the logic of the market for my musical creation; that is unacceptable to me; I don't want to be safe and this is why I spend so much time and money on my albums' (based on the English sub-titled translation). Meanwhile, those who value art wonder whether the tight IPR regime currently enforced in the OECD countries would have allowed them to enjoy reading the second part of 'Don Quixote '. 25 In this context, it is very interesting to note that, in the 2000s, the various actors of the Korean DS sector-stars and firms-have generated innovative alternatives to the OECD model of IPR legal regime. of 240 million won for using digital music files. Such a conclusion would not be possible in some OECD countries where such fees are automatically levied in similar circumstances.
On their side, K-pop stars have always been willing and able to 'internalize' IPR issues, making an OECD-type IPR regime of little use for them, if any. A first option is best illustrated by Rain who has composed his own songs, made his own choreographies, and owned his own firm. 26 The wide ranging education that K-pop stars receive during their inhouse training period helps them to achieve such a goal. An alternative option is best illustrated by BoA who owns shares of the DS firm (SM) which manages her.
On their side, Korean DS firms have faced two different IPR problems.
Their first problem is related to the K-pop performers: a Korean DS firm needs to minimize the risks that performers quit the firm when they become well-known The band structure helps to manage such risks: by ensuring that any member of the band needs the other members, it increases the costs of leaving the band; at the same time, it can be flexible enough to give some degree of freedom to (a) performer(s) by creating autonomous units within the band. Available evidence suggests that only 5 percent of the performers of the three major Korean DS firms have changed firms since 2000. 27 The Korean DS firms' second problem is the risk of piracy on the consumption side. The best way to fight piracy is to adopt a 'limit pricing' strategy, that is, to set the price of DS titles not at the monopoly level, but at a level low enough to discourage piracy. In the Korea of the late 1990s with little IPR enforcement, 'limit pricing' meant sale prices for downloads close to zero. 28 Since then, prices have increased but, as shown by Table 6 , they remain still very low-raising the question of why increasing prices only 'now' and 'modestly'.
 the answer to the 'now' part can be found in Table 3 . The boom of K-pop exports is recent: it started only in 2008, it was preceded by sluggish years and bad experiences, and K-pop remains a very risky business (see Figure 3 )-all factors that can explain the still careful confidence of the Korean DS firms in the K-pop 'miracle'.  answering the 'modestly' part is more complex. 29 The Korean DS firms may hesitate to increase prices because Korean consumers are highly skilled in software and equipped with the most advanced technology-hence have the ingredients to evade notable price increases. However, the key answer seems to involve Korean internet- 26 It is not rare that Western pop singers compose their own songs. But, they rarely do their own choreography and create their own firm-a feature shared by Jay-Z and Rain who are currently negotiating a contract. 27 Estimate based on the 221 names of current and past performers listed in Wikipedia's entries for SM, YG and JYP. But, 63 former trainees of one of these firms are managed by another (almost always Korean) DS firm. 28 This situation has much to do with the role of music in Joseon Korea. After the Restoration Coup of King Injo (1623) entertainers were banned from the Royal Court (contrary to what was happening in Europe) and entertainment became mostly a popular activity-with a focus on dance in Eastern Korea and on music in Western Korea, and with lively contests among bands organized by cities (little to envy to today TV shows…). 29 There is a planned annual increase from 105 won in 2013 to 150 won in 2015. providers (Melon, Soribada, etc.) and their telecom parent companies. These firms may want to limit the risk of foreign competitors entering the Korean OL market, hence are reluctant to let their OL prices coming close to Amazon's price (see Korea case C in Table 6 ). Despite some efforts in 2010-2011, the major Korean DS firms have so far not been able to offer a workable alternative to this situation.
Are the K-pop solutions to the IPR issues 'better' than the OECD typical approach-that is, do they offer more or better incentives to create? Answering this question goes much beyond this paper. But, columns 8 and 9 of Table 6 do not suggest any positive correlation between the IPR indexes and the dynamism of the DS segment. Rather, the countries with the highest IPR indexes (France, Germany) have completely failed to export their DS production to the world. Meanwhile, the low IPR index for Korea has not prevented the K-pop to start from nothing and to generate the current world tidal wave-offering the latest illustration of the 'Cervantes syndrome'.
SECTION 3. THE 'SUSTAINABILITY' OF THE K-POP WAVE
Is this so unexpected K-pop wave 'sustainable'? Will it be a hype limited to a narrow niche of the vast entertainment world, as it is so often the case in this industry? Or will it nurture more Korean waves in other entertainment sectors? Finally, would some public policies help for ensuring K-pop sustainability?
From the outset, it should be stressed that nothing in entertainment and art is sustainable: neo-classicism, baroque, impressionism, etc. have all peaked and then left the room to other artistic movements. 'Change' is the rule. As a result, the sustainability question should be rephrased as the question on 'how to change'.
Change by 'deepening'
A first way to change is to 'deepen' what is currently done in terms of production processes and contents. This is already happening in terms of processes with the 'internationalization' of K-pop: bands integrate performers from other Asian countries or create 'twin' K-pop bands with the same name but two languages (Exo-K and Exo-M); firms have an increasing recourse to songwriters and choreographers from all over the world; there is an increasing number of events outside Korea, etc.
This internationalization process should not present major challenges to the Korean DS firms. These firms rely on firm-specific skills (in-house academies, songwriters, etc.) embedded in a vertically integrated structure surrounded by sub-contractors and immerged in competitive markets. Such features make difficult for competitors to mimic quickly the Korean DS firms (it took two to three decades for the non-Japanese car producers to absorb the lessons of the Japanese car producers). That said, it remains to be seen whether this internationalization process will keep the 'Koreanness' (see the conclusion) feature of the current K-pop wave. Some Korean DS firms may opt for carefully keeping the 'K' of K-pop while others may put aside this feature in an effort to become simply 'pop' firms.
On the contents side, 'deepening' is ongoing for the visual part of the K-pop, with frequent innovations in the ways bands dance and music videos are created. Another obvious 'deepening' option would be to write lyrics on topics other than love stories among young people. This option is still largely unchartered by the current K-pop wave, but it looks both attractive and pressing because the first generation of K-pop stars and of their fans is now well in their early thirties-facing a range of new challenges and emotions in their life.
Change by 'diversifying'
Another way to change is to turn to other activities. Figure 1 The success of the diversification process relies heavily on the capacity of the current Kpop wave to create a larger and wider stock of capital of artistic talents by developing and widening the skills of the current K-pop stars. History suggests that this process of capital accumulation is usually slow and limited. 30 It remains to be seen whether the in-house academies and vertical integration which characterize the K-pop wave will produce better results. Anecdotic evidence (based on the number of Facebook hits) shows that six out of the ten most popular Korean actors in early 2013 are coming from K-pop bands, a sign that the diversification and capital accumulation process is actively ongoing. 31
A role for public policies?
As deepening and diversifying are not easy processes, is there a role for public policies?
Available evidence cautions strongly against a recourse to public policies. Second, the high level of patronage in Europe from the 10 th to the 19 th centuries needs to be correctly interpreted. Popes, kings and princes have spent lavish fortunes on painters, musicians, architects, etc. during all these centuries. But all these rulers were not modern states. Each of them was an individual who risked his/her personal fortune, reputation and pride as a better 'art connoisseur' than his/her pairs. Modern states do not share this essential feature of patronage, hence have a high propensity to be captured by vested interests ultimately detrimental to the 'culture' they claim to defend [Cocq and Messerlin 2004] .
Last, a quick look of what happened to J-pop (Japanese pop music, much fashionable in the 1990s in East Asia) and to 'F-pop' (French traditional pop music has reached its peak in the 1950s-1970s, but since then has disappeared from the world stage while an unrelated modern off-spring, the 'French Touch' with groups or individuals such as Daft Punk or David Guetta, is florishing with a K-pop type strategy based on electronic instruments as the source of comparative advantages) suggests that excessive regulations (intellectual property rights in Japan or France, music broadcasting in France) and public subsidies (movies in France) have slowly but surely smothered the creativity and the desire of the Japanese and French performers to go abroad and to deliver a message of 'Japaness' and 'Frenchness' to the rest of the world.
That said, there may be one exception to this non-interference of public policies in entertainment. As evoked above, Korea's peculiar price structure may reflect the use of 'limit pricing' by the internet providers and their telecom owners with the intention to eliminate potential competitors. A thorough analysis of this situation-of its costs and benefits-would be welcome, and the best institution to do so in an economically sound manner is the competition authority.
CONCLUSION. BEYOND ECONOMICS: ON THE 'KOREANNESS' OF THE K-POP WAVE
While the world is looking with amazement to this totally unexpected K-pop wave, Koreans wonder whether K-pop is sending some profound messages from and about Korea to the rest of the world. This conclusion examines briefly this issue.
'Koreanness'
What follows uses the notion of 'Koreanness' rather than Korean culture for several reasons: 32  today, the term 'culture' is often opposed to business and entertainment. This opposition is very recent (it was unknown until the late 19 th century) and it does not fit well the European art reality of the past centuries. 33 In fact, today Korean DS firms have many similarities with the European painters' studios of the 14 th -19 th centuries:
in-house training, vertical integration, loose (by today much criticized OECD 32 Similarly, one would prefer to use the term 'Frenchness' to French culture, for instance. 33 For instance, most European painters of the 15 th -19 th centuries have run large, highly profitable studios, with many "assistants" specialized in landscape, flowers, animals, etc. Raphael or Rubens had several dozen assistants each, with some of them becoming later as famous as their former 'masters' (Romano in the case of Raphael or van Dyck in the case of Rubens). Moreover, many of these famous artists were heavily involved in official positions, such as special envoys to other princely Courts. standards) intellectual property rights, and the use of the artists (painters in the past, K-pop stars today) in quasi-official (ambassadorial) positions.  the term 'culture' is limited to the 'physical assets' that a country has inherited from its past: books, music, paintings, architecture, etc. It ignores the country's 'human assets', namely the individual attitudes that today citizens of the country in question follow in public and that are so critical for delivering the messages from a country.  art history shows that it is not rare that foreigners capture and/or shape better the essence of a country than its own nationals. The two Korean heritages of the K-pop wave: "Unbreakable"
In sharp contrast, the Koreanness approach opens a wider perspective which suggests that indeed, the K-pop wave is the recipient of two Korean heritages-not one. 35 First, there is the heritage from the rural popular Namsadang dances which has little to do with the Confucian heritage: there could not be stronger contrast that the one between the Joseon very slow moving Court dances and the agitated K-pop dancers. But, this first heritage channels two profoundly Korean feelings which are extremely attractive to modern European audiences:
 it expresses sorrow and frustration ('han'), a frequent feeling among today distressed (especially young) Europeans. This sorrow is deeply embedded in the Korean people because of Korea's long and turbulent history. 36 34 For their title 'Catch Me', TVXQ has visual effects very similar to the traditional Korean "Fan Dance'. If this parenthood is correct, then it would be interesting to know whether the choreographer is Korean, or not. 35 A 'double' heritage is not unusual in the world art history. A parallel can be made with the Dutch painting school of the 16-17 th centuries which has been so influential in Europe. A large segment of this school focuses on the daily life of ordinary Dutch people with a fascination for its rude aspects (cats and dogs competing with dirty kids for food, explicit love scenes, drunk people, etc.) which have little to do with the other main 'branch' of Dutch paintings focusing on aristocratic values, gods and goddesses, etc. But, both branches are essential to get a great sense of 'Dutchness', as well as a sense of universality.
 it is 'fighting' this sorrow by developing an intense energy. 37 This energy is familiar to the Europeans to the extent that it has some affinity with African-based Western music, including with its capacity to lead to situations close to 'trance' [Lee Oi-soo 2013] . But, this energy is also totally new to the Europeans because it tries hard to bring back joy and cheer-whereas most of today Western performers deliver an oppressing sense of inertia, darkness and doom.
The second heritage of the K-pop bands is plain Confucian. It is not shown on the stage Two pieces of evidence reveal this curiosity. First, the K-pop wave has clearly triggered in Europe the recent boom in learning Korean. 39 Second, when interviewed on the reasons for being attracted by K-pop, Europeans (teens or their parents, recent immigrants or long-lasting citizens) often say that the K-pop offers 'other values' than the ones to which they are exposed in Europe. When asked to explain what they mean by 'new values', Europeans often cite respect, modesty, kindness [Arirang 2013 ]. Universal, these values are at the core of the 36 Korea's history exhibits frequent internal feudal wars until the 11 th century, fragmented ruling elites after the 12 th century, several destructive invasions from Japan, Mongolia and China (16th-17th centuries), the 'unequal treaties' with the Western powers (late 19 th century), thirty five years of Japanese colonial rule , and three years of a partly fratricide Korean War (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) which have nothing to envy, in terms of chaos and devastations, to the worst years of the Second World War in Europe. 37 The term 'fighting' is an expression that Koreans love to use in almost all circumstances. It echoes traditional Pumba, the singing beggars who show that cheering is possible even in poverty. 38 Europeans seem to have a different perception of the K-pop performers than South East Asians. In South East Asia, the dominant perception of the K-pop stars is based on identity-the K-pop performers are the spokepersons of some kind of 'Asianness'. In Europe, the dominant perception seems to be based on 'difference'the K-pop performers are the spoke-persons of 'new values'.
Confucian message that is thus channeled by K-pop performers' in their day-to-day attitudes with their fans and public. is very attractive to vast crowds. And if the pool of talents accumulated by the K-pop wave will progressively spread to and succeed in other entertainment and art sectors, it will deliver increasingly deeper and richer messages from Korea.
Since the first version of this paper, the music video 'Unbreakable' by Kim Hyun Joong, featuring Jay Park, has been released. It is a perfect illustration of this 'door' function of Kpop. In two minutes and half (the last minute is typical K-pop pure energy in dance, echoing "Rainism" from Rain), it presents no less than eight aspects of traditional Korean popular culture-from Korean dancers with sangmo hats to Korean drums to Salpuri and calligraphy.
In less than three months, this video has received 2.5 million clicks. There is little doubt that a good many watchers have gone to internet in order to know more about these various aspects of Korean traditional popular culture.
The second source of Koreans' doubts is the fear that the Korean culture of the grandparents' or parents' of the K-pop generation is too much receding in front of an amorphous, often corrosive 'modern' culture. 40 This fear is not specific to Koreans. It is shared by many people: the above quoted Europeans have a very similar fear. They feel that, during the few last decades, the universal values mentioned above (respect, modesty, kindness, etc.) have been deeply eroded in Europe-hence their profound aspiration to re-introduce them, as well captured by European scholars. 41
Such an aspiration is unlikely to be appealing to young Europeans if it is only based on nostalgia or thinking. Young Europeans may be much more attracted and convinced by the 40 In this respect, the debate on Psy's 'Gentleman' is interesting. Some of 'Gentleman' music video images have been seen as too 'un-Confucian' by some Koreans (for instance, the music-video has been banned on KBS). In this respect, the K-pop wave has probably lessons to learn from Korean TV dramas. A recent study [Song 2012] shows that the world audience has some specific expectations from Korean dramas per se: less sexuality and violence, more focus on family relationships (between parents and children and amongst children) on children born outside the family, etc. 41 See the work of philosophers such as Comte-Sponville [2001] in France.
double Koreanness of a lively K-pop-intense raw energy on stage and restrained Confucian public attitude out of the stage. This flamboyant contrast has the great privilege to make the aspiration to these essential values a new, colorful and cheerful start-not the restoration of an old order.
ANNEX 1. The K-pop concerts in Taiwan (March 2009 ~ December 2012)
This list deserves two observations. First is the huge number of concerts, including for the most famous K-pop bands. On average, there is 1.5 K-pop concert per month over this period. And, for instance, SuperJunior alone has had 5 concerts during this brief period of three years and nine months. Second, there is an almost identical number of concerts reserved to fans and of 'regular' concerts open to everybody. Note: Due to the limitation of space, sample of 24 firms between IU and 4Men, and compilation CD albums by various artists (thus, by various firms) are omitted even if they are included in the data analysis. Shorter names for firms are used (e.g. SM Entertainment, YG Entertainment, JYP Entertainment are shortened as SM , YG, and JYP). Note: Due to the limitation of space, shorter names for firms are used (e.g. SM Entertainment, YG Entertainment, JYP Entertainment are shortened as SM, YG, and JYP). Note: Due to the limitation of space, shorter names for firms are used (e.g. SM Entertainment, YG Entertainment, JYP Entertainment are shortened as SM, YG, and JYP). Note: Due to the limitation of space, shorter names for firms are used (e.g. SM Entertainment, YG Entertainment, JYP Entertainment are shortened as SM, YG, and JYP). Table 6 Differences between Korean prices and prices in the rest of the world for song (i.e the price for MP3 downloading) Source: Authors based on MP3 sale-price of one song on the Amazon, iTune and various sources from the domestic internet service providers. Note: For comparison, exchange rate (April 2013: 1$ = ₩ 1,113.5) is applied to transform original currency into Korean won. * The practice of free downloading for MP3 file through the shared websites prevails over most developing countries. iTune controls the price of songs through the locational access where you are connected to. For example, country's software of iTune becomes invalid when using it through the access of other countries' internet connection.
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